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September 3, 2008

Marek Swierczynski, journalist at TVP, Platinum Contributor (807)

Theoretically, Moldova is closely linked to Romania, a new NATO member and one that has US military presence on its soil. But in practice it is difficult to imagine NATO engagement in whatever happens, should the Author's scenario be fulfilled. It is Ukrane that would have to react and it would be better if that reaction was enjoying support both from the EU and NATO. But of course that would mean a Ukraine-Russia confrontation with many unpredictable effects - in regard to the Crimea for instance. The region of Transdnestria is a boiling pot - ready to spill heat in Europe's soft belly - because of Europe's neglect and reluctance. The only hope is that what happened in the Caucasus will set the alarm bell ringing.

September 3, 2008

Vladimir Shaporenko

It is very likely that Russia will push for Transdniestr re-integration with Moldova in the very near future. In fact, I think the process has already started. Of course, if nothing bad happens (another NATO move against Russia, sanctions, etc.). Moscow is reasonable if you talk with respect and take Russian interests into account.

September 4, 2008

Sybren

I very much doubt that Transnistria will be the next region to be the next breakaway province where a violent conflict will erupt. It seems to me that since Georgia and Russia were at war, people are clutching at straws to see where they can draw parallels. This one however does not cut it in my opinion.

Moldova knows better than to pick a fight with Transnistria. They did and lost before. Moreover, Moldova can not cope with a response by Russia (if one comes in the first place).
Russia's interest is to keep Moldova under control of its sphere of influence and prevent them from joining the EU and at a later stage possibly NATO. Russia has no interest in a violent conflict in that region and nor does Moldova or anyone else.

More important than a hypothetical conflict is to see what can be done about Transnistria as a haven of crime and illicit trade. The author's reference to Transnistria being an unaggressive and peaceful "state" throughout its history is one I do not share. Tranisnistria is known as an area of large scale drugs, arms and people trafficking which ramifications are felt far beyond its "borders". A hundreds of miles unpatrolled border with the Ukraine is providing part of the survival reasons of the regime of Smirnov.

Nor does Transnistria meet the requirements for sovereign statehood under international law. An effective elected authority is missing and the capability to enter international relations as well. Large scale privatisation is also something one should take with a grain of salt. Most of the companies in Tranisnistria are owned under the "Sherif" chain. A Chain directly linked with Smirnov and his followers. This can hardly be dubbed privatisation. Also the Tiraspol Times is the official newspaper of Transnistria and one that I would not recommend looking at for factual information about the territory.

It is more constructive in my opinion to discuss how to end the never ending stream of illegality emanating from Transnistria instead of discussing potential conflicts and what to do about it.

September 5, 2008

Ari Rusila, Freelancer, Platinum Contributor (178)

To Sybren:

I also hope that a violent conflict in Transnistria is unlikely and to avoid violence I proposed that EU should facilitate to find a peaceful solution.

About requirements for sovereign statehood I have more optimistic picture than you. I quote an analysis “The EU in Moldova – Settling conflicts in the neighbourhood” published by the European Union Institute for Security Studies:

“The secessionist authorities in Transnistria have managed to build a more or less functioning statelike entity. Transnistria has an organised political leadership, control over a defined territory and seeks international recognition… Economically, Transnistria has survived by trade...By the region’s standards, these factors have created a rather solid basis for the separatist leadership to claim that economically Transnistria is a functioning entity.

Let me compare Transnistria's economical base of Kosovo - which western Powers recognized some time ago. The export from Transnistria is over 500 m$ when Kosovo's export is some 70 m$ even when Kosovo has a population four times bigger than Transnistria. Also economical base of Transnistria is much more stronger including is a supplier of ferrous metal, machine-building products, light and food industry, electrical power, specialty construction materials and woodworking products. Transnistria is an important supplier of electrical cabling, winding wire, electric insulating material, explosion-proof engines, power transformers, AC generators, laminates and laminated bakelite insulations, molds for shoe production, and low-voltage electrical devices and pumps.

Transnistria is exporting to nearly 100 countries. Italy, Germany and the United States are important export markets, nevertheless, the bulk of the production still goes to the geographically closer CIS countries. Other notable countries for Transnistria's foreign trade include Switzerland, Romania, Great Britain, Poland, Cyprus and Turkey. Just over forty international joint ventures operate in Pridnestrovie. Partners include companies from Bulgaria, Canada, Hungary, Germany, Ireland, Poland, Russia, and Italy; employing nearly 6,000 people in total.

Your remarks about illicit trade, trafficking and smuggling are correct but again I think that problems smaller than e.g. in Kosovo where these activities have estimated over 1 bn$ turnover annually. This problem has been taken seriously in EU and "The EU Border Assistance Mission to the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine" was established in response to that. With this mission EU supports for capacity building for border management, including customs, on the whole Moldova-Ukraine border, including the border between Ukraine and the separatist Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, because the Moldovan border authorities are unable to be present there. The mission works in cooperation with FRONTEX and OLAF (EU agencies for border control and organized crime) and reports about this work have been quite encouraging.

September 5, 2008

Thomas Vanhauwaert, European Policy Centre, Bronze Contributor (13)

Dear Ari, dear Sybren,

Your discussion on a possible independence for Transnistria is interesting and I would like to make a few comments as well.

First of all, I would like to mention that the Transnistrian authorities have already declared in the past a couple of times their independence, but it was never recognised by anyone, not even Russia, its most fierce supporter. When Smirnov went to Moscow few months ago with the same request for recognition, he was sent back by Putin who told him that Transnistria's independence is not in Russia's interest.

Several reasons can be found for Russia's position. The most important one is that Russia is afraid of loosing Moldova to the West. Both NATO and the EU are interested in incorporating Moldova after the success stories of the Baltic states, and also Moldova sees how far these former Soviet Republics have progressed so far.

If Moldova would eventually join the "West", Russia would loose an additional former Soviet-Republic with a certain strategic relevance, although small, for the Black Sea. Now, if Russia recognises Transnistria's independence, it will cut the ties with Moldova and Moldova will turn its head for good to the West. Another post Soviet Republic lost for Russia.

Secondly, from a military point of view, Russia cannot keep Transnistria under its control, should a military conflict emerge. The distance is about 1.000 km between Russia and Transnistria, and the country in between, Ukraine, will not be eager to let the Russian troops use its soil as a transit country. Therefore, the Kremlin is not looking for a military confrontation which could be provoked by a recognition of independence.

Thirdly, Transnistria is becoming a burden on the Russian budget. Transnistria has never paid for its gas it receives from Gazprom, whereas Moldova pays properly all its bills on time to Gazprom/Kremlin. Moreover, Moldova has been growing economically over the past years and it is attracting many Russian investors, especially in the wine sector. In all, it means that the economic balance is shifting slightly to the advantage of Moldova. In other terms, supporting Moldova could bring more economic benefits to the Russians, than support for Transnistria. Since Russia has become a truly capitalist nation, economic calculations should not be overlooked in its foreign relations.

Related to that, the economic situation is quickly deteriorating in Transnistria. EUBAM has curtailed the illicit trading of the Smirnov customs regime, and revenues are decreasing at a fast pace for the authorities, putting them on the brink of financial collapse. The only way Transnistria can survive, is to ask for additional financial support from Russia.

The rate of inflation in Transnistria was over 30% in 2007. Food prices are rising quickly and people are starting complain. The story propagated by Transnistrian media that the situation is far better in Transnistria than in the rest of Moldova, is slowly loosing credibility inside the population. This can undermine the legitimacy of the Transnistrian authorities in the long run, possibly leading to an overthrow of the regime. This would be supported by the emerging Transnistrian business community, which sees more benefits in trading with the EU via Moldova, as the latter enjoys Autonomous Trade Preferences with the EU since recently.

As a result, Russia feels it has to react in this shaky situation. It tries to strike a lasting deal with Voronin, president of Moldova, and proposes to revive the Russian Cossack plan of 2003. This plan foresees in a confederal state structure for Moldova, whereby the regions have the bulk of power. Moreover, peace would be guaranteed by Russian peacekeepers.

In this scenario, the conflict is more or less resolved, and Russia can keep its decisive influence in Moldova. Transnistria remains under Russian de facto control, and Moldova cannot join Western organisations, if it doesn't have the consent of Transnistria. In this case, NATO accession is excluded for Moldova, Russia's concern number 1. Probably, full accession to the EU is excluded as well for at least 20 years.

It is hard to say what will be the outcome of the Medvedev-Voronin negotiations. For sure, Moldova will not accept all Russian points. Moldova will try to decrease the powers proposed for Transnistria and ask for a more neutral peacekeeping force. In the coming months, we will see a balancing act between Russian and Moldovan negotiators. Both parties have their strengths and weaknesses and seem to be at equal level, despite the enormous differences in size. The outcome will depend on the skills of the negotiators and how they play the game.

In my opinion, the situation in Georgia does not have a substantial direct influence on the situation in Moldova/Transnistria. I don't think it's appropriate to draw many similarities, because the dynamics are entirely different. In Georgia, we saw a devastating war between ethnic groups in the beginning of 90s, compared to Bosnia, but then on a smaller scale. Putting these ethnic groups together in one single political entity seems to be an impossible task. It's a zero sum game and people on both sides are prepared to go until the end.

In Transnistria, it's not about a zero sum game between ethnicities which are prepared to fight each other until the bitter end. It is more about post Soviet political and economic elites which have merged under one umbrella trying to keep their business going, mainly heavy industry, under their own rules without annoying interference from Moldova. For this reason, they have managed to establish a state-like entity, taking care of their inhabitants.

The Transnistrian authorities have never succeeded in creating animosity and fear between ethnic groups. In this regard, bear in mind that ethnic Moldovans/Romanians are still the largest ethnic group in Transnistria. Therefore, I don't think the Transnistrian population will be strongly asking at this moment for independence as a reaction on the recent developments in Georgia. Moreover, as I explained before, Russia will not push for Transnistria's independence under current circumstances.

To summarise my arguments and come to the main point, independence for Transnistria is not likely in the short run. Either the status-quo remains, either Moldova can strike a deal with Russia on the status of this region. It's hard to say what will be the outcome at the moment.

In any case, Russia will keep its influence in the country and will be the key to Moldova's future. The only thing the EU effectively can do is to make the position of Moldova stronger in its negotiations with Russia. Both by supporting Moldova's overall development as a country, and undermining the illicit economic activities of the Transnistrian regime, as they violate international trade law due to its non-respect for customs laws.

Finally, Moldova is only a minor pawn in the game between Russia and the EU, whereas Ukraine is the queen. The relevance of Moldova stems mainly from the fact that it can be considered as the runner-up for Ukraine's accession to the West. Therefore, Russia tries to keep the country under its influence to prevent this runner-up possibility. As a result, it is not likely that Russia will hand over this pawn to the West/EU, unless it gets something in return for it and if it receives the guarantee that Ukraine will not absorbed by the West.

September 6, 2008

Nazira Toktalieva, Center Polis Asia, Central Asia, Silver Contributor (35)

Organisation for Collective Security Agreement (OCSA) DOES NOT RECOGNIZE ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA


MOSCOW/05.09.08/TURAN: The Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Collective Security Agreement (OCSA) supported Russia’s active role in promoting peace and cooperation in the Caucasus on the basis of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the international treaties of 1966 and other basic documents of the international law.

The Advisor of the OCSA Information Department, Vitaly Strugovetz said the Foreign Ministers made the appropriate statements. "We support strengthening of stability in the region, in particular, providing of safety for South Ossetia and Abkhazia," the statement noted. The Ministers were deeply concerned with the events in South Ossetia, which had been triggered by the Georgian side. They caused numerous victims among the population and led to a terrible humanitarian catastrophe.

"The tragedy in South Ossetia shows the danger of increase in the military potential in the Caucasian region and the danger of attempts to solve the conflicts by force. The events in South Ossetia also demonstrated the danger of double standards. The Ministers call on all the sides to assess the situation objectively and not to act in the way able to aggravate it," the statement reads.

The OCSA Foreign Ministers ignored Moscow’s calls to admit the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The statement did not condemn Georgia in the strictest way wanted by Russia either.

This has become a second serious failure of the Russian diplomacy since the Shanghai Cooperation Organization refused to support Moscow’s actions.

September 7, 2008

Ari Rusila, Freelancer, Platinum Contributor (178)

Dear Thomas,

Thanks for your fine analysis. One peaceful outcome can indeed be confederation model where Transnistria's independende will not de jure widely be recognized only de facto. I still reconsider the future of Transnistria quite bright mostly because its economical base which I keep much more better than some other already independent states.

I agree with you that the big question is Ukraine, but my forecast is that Ukraine case - e.g. annexing Crimean Peninsula back to Russia - will be actual Spring 2009.

September 9, 2008

Heinrich Bonnenberg, Energiewerke Nord
DGAP, Platinum Contributor (229)

In April 2009 with the end of the 10 years Russian-Ukrainian contract of April 17th, 1999!