To the Director of [a large Russian coal company],
Your refusal to contribute financially to the regional division of the “United Russia” party for the upcoming election campaign to the 5th State Duma of the Russian Federation will be considered as a refusal to support President V.V. Putin and his constructive direction.
It becomes necessary to inform the Administration of the President and the Governor of [a central Russian Oblast] of your decision.
Thus reads a letter from the Kremlin’s party to a would-be (or should-be) supporter in Russian industry ahead of parliamentary elections on December 2 and presidential elections in 2008. This snippet of Russian campaigning is quite clear. On the other hand, Vladimir Putin’s plans for the presidential election, now set for March 2, are positively Orwellian in their ambiguity.
Speaking to a number of United Russia cadres on November 28, Putin said, “Our political course is defined. It has been defined clearly and remains unchanged. We are following the path of democratic development. And the priorities here remain ensuring and achieving human rights and freedoms, creating conditions for the realization of the potential of each citizen.” Even a casual follower of Russian politics during Putin’s second term will be well aware that Russia has strayed so far from the path of democratic development as to have pulled a U-turn, and that the priorities of the state are order and conformity, not human rights and freedoms. But the most Alice-in-Wonderland piece of Putin’s statement is the previous phrase—Russia’s political course is entirely undefined. It is neither clear, publicly or privately, nor will it remain unchanged. The one certainty about Russia’s 2008 transition of power is that it will be unpredictable.
So far, Putin has been able to dazzle Western Kremlin observers, Russian political analysts and even his fellow siloviki with impressive tacks and jibes. At one point, analysts were certain that First Deputy Prime Ministers Sergei Ivanov or Dmitri Medvedev would be groomed for succession. Then came speculation that Putin might anoint a “caretaker” president and return after two years. With the Kremlin’s co-opting of United Russia, it seemed that Putin might somehow run for prime minister. The latest fad is to contemplate a Putin resignation before the new year, so that he could constitutionally run for a third term in March. The eventual mode through which Putin retains power will likely be entirely different from all of the above.
While United Russia’s majority in the Russian Duma after December 2 may not end up as large as Western observers assume, the outcome is nevertheless certain. Aside from election finagling, the beating and bullying of the opposition, the absence of enough impartial observers, and Kremlin control of Russia’s media, the administration has successfully framed the polls as a referendum on Putin’s popularity, thereby garnering extra support for United Russia. However, when that popularity is truly tested, in March, the outcome will only be certain to one man—and he will make sure to keep us all guessing.
Alexandros Petersen is an Adjunct Fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC.
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