Atlantic Community:Open Think Tank Article "Western Woes and Rogue Pride"

We are watching the rogue state label become converted into a badge of honor, accepted as a point of pride by those countries it was supposed to stigmatize. Even if the current bond between “revolutionary brother-nations” Iran and Venezuela is more propaganda than substance, the trend towards closer cooperation between the “rogues” is problematic. Chávez has been trying to enlist other “underdogs” for his “Axis of Good”: his visits to Belarus, Zimbabwe, Russia, Cuba are ample evidence of this. North Korea is also on his shortlist of allies, even though a trip to Pyongyang in July 2006 was cancelled at the very last minute. Technological complementarities between these economies make this “parallel diplomacy” potentially viable. It is not hard to imagine these countries moving from rhetoric and symbolism towards a more meaningful cooperation in the future. It is already happening in the Iran-Venezuela nexus, albeit slowly. Pushing the “rogues” hard will only make them close their ranks more.

To confront this challenge, the West needs allies old and new: not only long-time partners such as Australia, South Korea, Japan or Turkey, but also major democratic emerging powers that can seriously contribute to the proliferation of Western ideals, such as Brazil, India, Mexico and South Africa. Improving relationships with emerging powers now could mean that in the future they might once again see Western values as worth emulating.

The relative weakening of the West and the waning of the power of its ideals has negative repercussions on the further spread of democracy and peace in the world. Non-Western models of global order are often not fundamentally based on freedom. These alternative models feature regional or even global actors who oppose regional integration based upon equality between member states and pluralism. To reverse this trend, the West must commit to advancing its own concepts of liberty, prosperity and justice. This is not an argument for any form of democracy promotion by force: the West as a truly powerful actor on the world stage can only be reconstructed through the power of its ideals and values, and not through the power of its military machine.

As during the Cold War, respecting Western ideals at home will give Western foreign policy legitimacy and force: from liberty, prosperity and justice come comprehensive human rights and their protection, a high level of liberal democracy respecting the rule of law, and economic development to the benefit of all. The Western ideals are ethically ambitious and aim at liberating and empowering citizens. This is what should constitute their power of attraction. By strictly adhering to these self-imposed principles, the West could again find new friends and allies in different regions of the world.

Emerging powers must be convinced that they can become true partners of the West and share its values: Where a common basis of shared values exist, special technological and military relationships can be an effective instrument for a deepened partnership. This should include not only cooperation on security and defense matters—possibly including Western aid for multinational brigades in the world regions—but also the exchange (and supervision) of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. NATO and the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), the effective functional organizations in these policy areas, are the most important tools for such a partnership.

Another important stepping stone in building reliable and sustainable partnerships is Western support for (liberal) regional integration schemes in the world. In the long term, this could help forge regional identities that rely on mutual trust and respect—and thus decrease the likelihood of conflict in that region.

The West’s “rogue state” label was supposed to outlaw and isolate illiberal regimes and rally the allies of the West around the cause of democracy. Now, however, it is this international ban that provides the glue for this new “outcast diplomacy,” a very specific form of South-South-cooperation. In the medium and long term, this “rogue pride” could lead to a global “Axis of Good”, a true axis of rogues. The transatlantic partners should recognize this nascent trend and act on it now.

Christian E. Rieck is project assistant in the International Cooperation Department of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation (KAS) and Editor Latin America of the World Security Network (WSN). He is also a lecturer at Humboldt-Universität Berlin and member of the KAS Working Group on Foreign Policy.

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November 20, 2007

Nikolas Kirrill Gvosdev, U.S. Naval War College, Platinum Contributor (327)

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India and South Africa will be two major test cases of the extent to which a World Without the West, to use the formulation of Steven Weber and his associates provides a realistic and attractive alternative to the Western-led and guided international order. And one outcome may be to accept that, just as in the Cold War, India and some of the other "southern democracies" may want to be "neutral" and commit to neither siding fully with the trans-Atlantic bloc on one hand--despite shared values--or with the Shanghai-style group--despite strong economic ties.

November 21, 2007

Lior Petek, University of St. Gallen, Platinum Contributor (216)

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The author overlooks a major paradox in his argument.

On the one hand, he wants the West to stop using "rogue states" rhetoric as it apparently drives the "rogue states" closer to each other strategically.

On the other hand, he wants the West to showcase its true adherence to Western values and principles in order to bring emerging powers closer to itself.

Since "The West’s “rogue state” label was supposed to outlaw and isolate illiberal regimes and rally the allies of the West around the cause of democracy", stopping it (for instrumental reasons) runs counter to showcasing the West's seriousness about its values and principles.

November 22, 2007

Christian E. Rieck, GIGA German Institute for Global and Area Studies, Silver Contributor (66)

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Dear Lior,

the rogue state label is not working: instead of isolating it has emboldened illiberal regimes. It has given an excuse to many governments to further consolidate power and violate human rights – and legitimizing this by playing the Anti-Western (i.e. the Anti-American) card. Worse still, governments on the rogue shortlist can simply point a finger towards Guantánamo (if not Abu Ghraib) and use it to invert the rogue state rhetoric by accusing “the West” or the United States of hypocrisy. The rogue state label is catchy but needlessly aggressive and invites the strongman (and emancipatory) rhetoric we have come to know from dictators around the world.

And right they are. If the West really is the famed community of values (and not simply an alliance of historical convenience) and a truly universal project, it has to shift its foreign policy focus away from raw military force towards the soft-spoken power of the law and its ideals. The best Public Diplomacy is a renewed domestic commitment to the values (Western) human rights stand for. I would therefore understand the “seriousness of its values and principles” you demand as being primarily domestically focused.

Still, I do not see the foreign policy dimension as only “instrumental” or “realist”. A value-based approach towards the emerging powers is implicitly a (constructive) inversion of the (confrontational) rogue state rhetoric. Establishing close ties with emerging powers will not be possible without some degree of pragmatism but all those “special relationships” can be designed to include clauses on democracy and transparency and human rights. As in the case of the nuclear technology cooperation, they can also be designed to be compatible with existing international regimes. A new drive to strengthen those different regimes of International Law, complemented by a more muscular enforcement of its rules, would be a strong signal of “seriousness” indeed.

This, however, would have to mean less suspicions about the United Nations and more Western (financial and military) assets under the UN umbrella – as deficient this organization might be. A push for more inclusiveness, transparency, efficiency and democracy in the UN might also do some good. The “internationalization” of the Western commitment towards its values and principles is not the worst strategy to impress the emerging countries.

I look forward to your comments.

Best regards,
Christian

November 22, 2007

Christian E. Rieck, GIGA German Institute for Global and Area Studies, Silver Contributor (66)

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Dear Nikolas,

thank you for the Cold War analogy and your remarks on the “southern democracies”. I fully agree with you that there is a good chance a new kind of “non-aligned movement” will emerge, especially if the relations between the West and other alternative world orders like the Shanghai-style idea of regional “integration” become strained.

The economic prowess of major emerging powers like India or Brazil give them an option beyond the binary model of international relations theory: assimilation or confrontation. They can choose not to be part of the present liberal order while at the same time also not challenge it. There is a real possibility of “cherry-picking”: free-riding on public goods sponsored by the West and benefiting from the economic bonanza in the East.

India, Brazil and South Africa all have, for good historical reasons, powerful anti-colonial reflexes. With their emerging power status comes a prestige and pride that will make any kind of partnership with them difficult, to say the least. Japan and South Korea are close allies of the West because of hard security guarantees given by Washington, and not because of the mere “attraction” of Western values. But today both are democratic beacons in a region where democracy sill struggles. This tells me that meaningful cooperation in hard policy fields is essential if the values behind them are to have any legitimacy at all.

If we want liberal democracy to bloom in order for the capitalist peace to prevail we should strive for enlightened engagement with the world regions to change the political calculus in those countries. This will be a frustrating and long-term endeavour as special relationships with the South have failed again and again. But that is exactly why the West needs to reach out to the major emerging powers – and offer them mechanisms for a meaningful partnership and not mere “we are all democracies” rhetoric.

Looking forward to your ideas on this,

Best regards,
Christian

November 24, 2007

Lior Petek, University of St. Gallen, Platinum Contributor (216)

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Dear Christian,

Thank you for replying to my comment. However, I do not think you have overcome the paradox in your argument I tried to call your attention to.

Let us assume that “the rogue state label is not working” (one could argue, though, that having led the Iranian and Venezuelan governments “to further consolidate power and violate human rights”, it has encouraged increasing domestic opposition as can be seen by the growing amount and intenseness of student protests). This does not invalidate the fact that rogue state rhetoric is “a value-based approach” as it is directed at states that disrespect Western values in the most obvious and conscious way. Thus, I do not see how stopping addressing and criticizing “illiberal regimes” by giving up the rogue state rhetoric will convince emerging powers that the West is committed to its values. On the contrary, it will seem to the emerging powers that the West is abandoning its mission to promote its values.

I fully agree with you that the West needs to strengthen its domestic commitment to its values in order to decrease the possibility of being exposed and ignored as hypocrites. Yet I do not see how this automatically follows from the prescription that the West should stop using its rogue state rhetoric or even how this is a (better) substitute for the latter. Therefore, if the West is and wants to promote the image that it is seriously committed to its values, it should improve its domestic record in addition to using its rogue state rhetoric.

This said, (referring to your assessment that the rogue state rhetoric “is not working”) the (instrumental) question than would be how to address and criticize these “rogue states”. Referring to specific lacking observance of Western values when using the rogue state label may help. But perhaps you have a better idea in mind as to how to address and criticize these states in absence of a rogue state rhetoric, since you do not elaborate on this in your argument?

November 27, 2007

Christian E. Rieck, GIGA German Institute for Global and Area Studies, Silver Contributor (66)

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Dear Lior,

thank you for again pointing out the value of the rogue state label. Indeed, foreign policy should not be indifferent towards the lack of democracy and human rights in other countries – for it to have any leverage at all to improve the domestic situation in those countries, however, it should not fall into the rhetorical trap of “good vs. evil” the anti-Western regimes have set. But, basically, I agree with you that we need some kind of “label”, a normative concept that tells apart the governments that share Western values from the ones that don’t.

So, yes, we need some kind of label. I also liked your idea of denominating the specific (Western) values the “rogues” disregard. But still, we shouldn’t use (overly) confrontational concepts like the “axis of evil” or an array of “rogues”, but rather (lees heated) concepts like “deficient democracies”, “illiberal regimes”, “authoritarian governments” or plain “dictatorships”. Clustering all of the above in a fuzzy “rogue state” concept that includes the governments the West doesn’t like but excludes the ones the West needs, will not help democracy and human rights. So, apart from being a concept that is normatively dishonest, it is also empirically flawed.

I understand that the fundamental paradox that lies at the heart of this matter is that of (military and economic) power: As in the cases of Latin America or the Middle East, whatever the United States does or does not will always find critics galore. If it intervenes for the sake of democracy this measure is taken to be one of Western Imperialism, if it accommodates to authoritarian regimes then it is called a hypocrite that betrays its very own values. This conundrum will of course always accompany power, but here more diplomacy in rhetoric can help defuse the verbal standoff between “the West and the rest” – and not unnecessarily escalate it by using a (too) confrontational rhetorical figure that will only invite more grandstanding on both sides.

Thus, even though we need some kind of specific concept, using a more constructive “rogue label”, in my opinion at least, has an important added value.

Best regards,
Christian

November 27, 2007

Lior Petek, University of St. Gallen, Platinum Contributor (216)

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Dear Christian,

Thank you once again for taking my objections seriously.

I really liked your comment as it elaborated on a part in your argument that I thought was missing. You have made clear that it is indeed part of your argument that "foreign policy should not be indifferent towards the lack of democracy and human rights in other countries". This was not so obvious for me when I read your article, so I appreciate you gave your opinion on this.

Thus, I think have come to a consensus on the point that your argument of avoiding the rogue state label does not imply that "rogue states" should no longer be critically addressed.

So thanks again for engaging into a sincere discussion with me.

Best regards,
Lior

November 27, 2007

Nikolas Kirrill Gvosdev, U.S. Naval War College, Platinum Contributor (327)

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Dear Christian,

I think we are in agreement that we are moving beyond any sort of binary model for world affairs. I do think, though, that this is more of a difficulty for our (U.S.) policymakers than for Europeans to deal with--and some of the recent friction in U.S.-India relations demonstrates that.

I don't know, for example, whether the tone of the letter that Congressman Lantos and other U.S. figures sent to Prime Minister Singh earlier this year protesting India's ties with Iran was a good start to a new approach toward a more meaningful partnership.

Some of this discussion also spills over, to some extent, on the themes that Mark Brzezinski is arguing define Senator Obama's approach to foreign policy.

December 3, 2007

Christian E. Rieck, GIGA German Institute for Global and Area Studies, Silver Contributor (66)

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Dear Nikolas,

interesting that you write that the “post-binary model” for world affairs is more of a problem for US policymakers than for Europeans. Could that be because European policymakers are (or should be) used to the benefits as well as pitfalls of collective decision-making?

To be sure, collective decision-making is not a value in itself: even with a strong common foundation it is cumbersome and prone to deadlock – if no pork-barrelling or “package deals” are available to dissuade divergent interests. However, collective decision-making is indeed an effective way to confer legitimacy upon policy decisions in the face of opposition. Even with wildly diverging interests (as is often the case in EU decision-making), all the participating actors have reached the final decision together and all have to explain it to their constituencies (and opponents) as part of a “college of decision-makers”. This is a much stronger unifier than any “coalition of the willing” can ever be.

I understand that the voluntariness of a coalition of the willing makes it efficient in terms of decision-making and enforcement. However, if legitimacy is key, then collective decision-making can deliver in a much broader sense. Mark Brzezinski sympathetically termed this “burden sharing” vs. “genuine partnerships”.

Still, the broader legitimacy on the input side of the “partnership equation” also needs strong results on the output side: not just “burden sharing” but a profound “knowledge sharing” that will enable and empower the weaker partner in the policy areas that have been defined as integral to the “genuine” or “meaningful partnership”. Only then will the hassle of collective bargaining be of any real value to the participating actors and countries.

Having said that, there will be no guarantees for smoothness even in “genuine partnerships”. Emerging powers are difficult partners – and they have a right to their own interests and contradictions. The West – the EU as well as the US – needs to accept that and not expect allegiance in exchange for dialog. So you are right in one thing, Nikolas: patronizing is not partnership, respect is.

Best regards,
Christian

January 27, 2008

Kyle Atwell, Atlantic Review, (2)

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Christian and Nikolas,

Thank you for the good discussion. You both bring up interesting points, including the suggestion that, "the “post-binary model” for world affairs is more of a problem for US policymakers than for Europeans."

Christian's suggestion that, "European policymakers are (or should be) used to the benefits as well as pitfalls of collective decision-making," is well received. I think we can go even deeper into understanding why the US has a greater tendency to create (often false) dichotomies when viewing the world, by asking a simple question: what are the underlying reasons why Europe pursues collective decision-making in the first place?

I suspect it has to do with the fact that the Europeans want to be a global power.

The United States has long been able to be an independent power, both during the Cold War and even more so today as the hegemon. While Europe was clearly important for the US and central to its strategic planning during the Cold War, it was always the US protecting Europe and not the other way around. There wasn't so much a need for the US to enter into collective bargaining, because it could secure itself and held the upper hand in most negotiations. The US always had a voice at the table.

Individual European countries could never provide for their own security. They needed strength through numbers, and so cooperation and mutual dependency increased over time. For Europe, collective bargaining was very much a matter of survival. I often hear justification for ESDP and a common EU foreign policy based on the idea that the only way for European countries to have a global voice will be to work together. For Europe, cooperation is key, and so I think they are less likely to pidgeon-hole others as enemies when they may end up leading some far-fetched political union together (it wasn't too long ago France and Germany were fighting against each other).

Another separate but related thought: as the global hegemon, the US is constantly criticized for its actions (as brought up earlier). The US is the easy target for criticism in any situation, and so it is easy to see why it may take on a dichotomous view of the world: for US policymakers, it often feels like it is the world verse the hegemon.

November 19, 2007 | 10 comments | Print this Article | E-Mail Your Opinion

Western Woes and Rogue Pride