As Presidents Obama and Medvedev met in Moscow to agree on reductions in their strategic nuclear
arsenalsAs Presidents Obama and Medvedev met in Moscow to agree in reductions on their strategic nuclear arsenal, events inside Iran continued to evolve. An
increasing segment of the Iranian population worries about the disappearance of
"semi-democracy" in favor of totalitarian rule. Influential clerics have indicated
their lack of support for the results of the June 12 elections, which led to a
second term for the incumbent, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
In the weeks
after the election, cell phone images and Twitter accounts of a brutal
government crackdown on the reform movement were uploaded to the Internet.
Billions of people around the world continue to witness a regime, and the authority
of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, losing the legitimacy established
with the Islamic Revolution three decades ago.
It is too soon to
know the ultimate outcome of these events, which may take years to play out in domestic
politics. The transatlantic allies must remain proactive in nuclear diplomacy
within the P5+1. There must be a readiness to engage Iran
with a unified negotiating line should the leadership in Tehran decide to respond to the package on
the table. President Obama is prudent to expect a signal from the Iranians by
September as to their interest, or lack thereof, for serious engagement. Iran shows no
sign of halting its nuclear aspirations as time passes.
Even though the
ball is now in Iran's
court, the transatlantic allies should not play a waiting game. There is much
work to do particularly in the bilateral talks US
diplomats conduct with Russia
and China.
The Obama Administration's seriousness about non-proliferation with the
Russians demonstrates leadership by the power of example. E3 diplomacy with
Russian and Chinese counterparts must also aim to unify negotiating positions
vis-à-vis Iran.
This is complicated during an election year for the Germans, who have
significant economic relations with Iran. The accent must be on a
package that highlights Iran's
inherent right to a civilian nuclear program with a nuclear-fuel-cycle
capability of its own under intensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
control and verification.
There is another
player to which the transatlantic allies must now increasingly turn in the
overall relationship with Iran
after the events of June 12: Turkey.
The absence of conflict between Iran
and Turkey
is due to the rough strategic balance between the two countries despite mutual
threat perceptions from their respective political regimes. Turkey is concerned about Iran's missile
and nuclear programs. The Turkish leadership defines threat as a combination of
motivations and capabilities, which is why maintaining good neighborly
relations with Tehran is important for Ankara.
The new
direction of Turkish foreign policy defined by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu
focuses on protracted issues with neighbors and aspires to reduce tension. Ankara values dialogue
and mutual understanding thereby defining security positively. Turkey qualifies to be a "bridge" between two
civilizations vis-à-vis Iran,
namely, the West and the Persian.
The key Turkey holds is the ability to understand Iran, to assess the behavior of the leadership
in Tehran, as
well as Iranian expectations during multilateral talks. This does not
necessarily mean that Ankara endorses Iran's
policy or views. Turkey can
see why Tehran
takes a specific policy line and continues to pursue that line with
determination. For Iran,
"independence" and "self-sufficiency" are integral. Foreign dependence on fuel
for its nuclear reactors is unacceptable.
The point
of contention is transparency regarding Iran's uranium enrichment program
and nuclear facilities. For this reason, Ankara
has underlined and insisted that Iran ratify the Additional Protocol
for more effective IAEA inspections to verify its compliance with the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Turkey
is equally concerned about the possibility of a nuclear Iran for its national security as
well as its regional and international implications. Ankara has its own plans to develop nuclear
energy and would not like to see a tighter regime to the disadvantage of
non-nuclear-weapon states, which aim to transfer nuclear technology for
peaceful purposes.
For these
reasons, Turkey can provide
a value-added to the P5+1's diplomatic efforts as one of the most enthusiastic
actors to keep Iran
on track in its aspirations for a civilian nuclear program.
Colette
Mazzucelli teaches on graduate faculty at the Center for Global Affairs, New
York University and is an Adjunct Associate Professor in the Department of
Political Science at Hofstra University's College of Liberal Arts and Sciences.
Sebnem
Udum is a PhD candidate in Bilkent University's International Relations
Department who focuses on Turkish foreign and security policy,
non-proliferation, and energy issues.
Related Materials from the Atlantic Community:
- Florian Broschk: Little Opportunity for the West to Influence Iran
- Editorial Team: How to Repsond to the Iranian Elections?
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August 3, 2009
Marton Molnar, ul, (7)
On the other hand however, we still have to note that Turkey is a secular country and dividing religion and state might appears in the eye of Iranian leaders as a sin. If this feeling is stronger, then bringing Turkey into the talks might not add too much to the progression. It certainly would not hurt them though.