The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, referred to
as the NPT, is the centerpiece of the world's nonproliferation regime.
The impetus for the NPT, signed in 1968, was concern that a potentially
rapid expansion of the number of states possessing nuclear weapons
would result in what President Kennedy had called "the greatest
possible danger." The non-nuclear weapons states agreed to forgo
acquisition of nuclear weapons; in return, the five nuclear weapons
states committed "to pursue negotiations in good faith" to work toward
nuclear disarmament.
There are ominous signs that the NPT is
unraveling. Israel, India, and Pakistan, the only states that declined
to ratify the NPT, now possess nuclear arsenals. North Korea withdrew
from the treaty and detonated a nuclear device in 2006. Iran continues
to enrich uranium, ostensibly as fuel for nuclear power reactors; but
with minor modifications, the enrichment process can produce highly
enriched uranium that can be used to make nuclear weapons.
Now
that nuclear power is back in fashion, there is general agreement that
the world faces another tipping point, similar to the 1960s, that
requires major initiatives to prevent an extensive proliferation of
states able to produce nuclear weapons in a short space of time.
Mohammed El Baradei, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), has estimated that some 50 states have what he terms "breakout"
capability.
The NPT specifies that all states have an
"inalienable right" to produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes. The treaty does not prohibit states from enriching uranium or
reprocessing spent reactor fuel to produce plutonium, the fissionable
materials that can be used to produce nuclear weapons. Moreover, the
NPT permits member states to withdraw from the treaty with three months
notice that "extraordinary events" have jeopardized their "supreme
interests." El Baradei warns that there soon could be more than 25
states with nuclear weapons, many unstable and prone to takeover by
extremists.
To combat the "breakout" problem and prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, President Obama has proposed a
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, with verification provisions, to
prohibit states from producing materials that can be made into nuclear
weapons, and universal ratification of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, to
minimize the likelihood of more states becoming nuclear powers. In
addition, he advocated strengthening the NPT by authorizing more
intrusive inspections by the IAEA and heavy penalties for countries
that break the rules or withdraw irresponsibly from the treaty.
Especially
difficult, however, will be inducing non-nuclear weapons states to
accept even more restrictions when several already have declared that
they will not cooperate unless the nuclear weapons states fulfill their
NPT commitment to negotiate in good faith toward nuclear disarmament.
So President Obama's commitment to seek a world without nuclear weapons
is an essential prerequisite to obtaining agreement with measures to
head off the dangerous situation posited by El Baradei.
But
is global zero feasible? The possibility appears remote, since states
could conceal weapons that cannot be detected with currently available
technology. However, President Obama's pledge was not irresponsible. He
stated that the goal "will not be reached quickly - perhaps not in my
lifetime," and he pledged that "the United States will maintain a safe,
secure and effective" nuclear deterrent so long as other nations
possess nuclear weapons.
Former Senator Sam Nunn, co-chair and
chief executive officer of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, has provided
an apt analogy: working toward global zero is like facing a mountain
covered at the top by a cloud, so we don't know if we can make it all
the way up. Yet it's important to start the climb by obtaining prompt
agreement on measures to prevent nuclear proliferation. Effective
action to do so depends on compliance by the nuclear states with their
commitment to negotiate in good faith toward the goal of nuclear
disarmament.
US Army Lt. General Robert G. Gard, Jr., PhD, is Chair at the Center for Arms Control & Non-Proliferation. After retiring from the army in 1981, Gard served as director of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies Center in Bologna, Italy, and as President of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Since 1998, he has been an active consultant in Washington, D.C., on national security issues.
Related Materials from Atlantic-Community:
- Global Zero: Barry M. Blechman: Eliminating Nuclear Weapons: Yes, We Can
- Global Zero: Charles D. Ferguson: Cold War Lessons for Today's Nuclear Disarmament Debate
- Global Zero: Hall Gardner:Precondition for Abolition: Five Factors for Consensus Building
- Global Zero: Kenneth N. Luongo: Controlling Loose Nukes
- Global Zero: Subrata Ghoshroy: Focus on Intermediat Steps
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