Asia Reverting to Authoritarianism?
Joshua Kurlantzick | Carnegie Endowment | December 2008
In the 1990's Asia was considered the pioneer in democratic renewal. Out of Asia spread a democratic wave from southern Europe through Latin America and into Africa. In recent times, however, democratization in Asia has experienced significant set-backs. Quasi-authoritarian regimes in Sri Lanka, Cambodia, and the Philippines set the military against political opposition and profit from declared "states of emergency" in order to extend the powers of the state. In Thailand in 2006 the military took power and thereafter abolished the constitution, which was reformed in 1997. In the most repressive states such as Myanmar and Fiji, democracy and freedom appear farther away than ever before. The democratic system's attractive force is diminishing in Asian countries as the fascination for authoritarian state models, such as those in China and Russia, is growing.
For decades the United States was the strongest, influential, foreign power in Asia. At the end of the 1990's, Washington promised to push ahead democratization in Asia and make life harder for authoritarian powers . Yet, after 9/11 this promise lost some of its credibility. The War on Terror absorbed all of the White House's attention and damaged America's moral standing. For cooperation purposes in the War on Terror, the US turned the its back on instances in countries like Cambodia or Malaysia where critics of the regime were abused - provided that these instances would be dubbed as anti-terror measures. In the meanwhile America's image suffered to such an extent that political reformers and political activists have done everything in order to not be tied to US financial aid. China and Russia have skillfully utilized this development. They praise their own authoritarian systems as models of a successful combination of economic liberalization without political modernization, which many Asian countries should imitate if possible. They present themselves as defenders of state sovereignty: in short, no state should assert itself into the domestic concerns of another state - sanctions for ignoring human rights and the support of pro-democratic development included.
Amongst these faltering Asian democracies (besides, of course, the established democracies of Japan, India, South Korea and Taiwan, which demonstrate no noteworthy democratic weaknesses) there is an exception: Indonesia has defended itself until now against any reversion to authoritarianism and can confidently affirm having become the most stable democracy in south Asia. Under President Yudhoyono important democratic institutions were strengthened and the public belief in democracy was solidified. Yudhoyono supported the courts decision to revise security laws that provided long-standing politicians with immunity and imprisoned political opponents. As the primary head of state he seems to have realized that democratization doesn't move forward on its own but requires permanent political support. This is also valid for the United States: if the US again supports authoritarian powers in Asia, this will inevitably open the door for influence from less democratic actors like Russia and China.
This summary was prepared by the Atlantic Community editorial team from "Asia's Democracy Backlash" published here by Current History, November 2008.
Related materials from the Atlantic Community:
- Sonja Davidovic: China's Energy Policy in the Geopolitical Context
- Wolfgang Nowak: The Rise of the Rest
- Daphne Wolf: Myanmar Needs Local Action and Aid on a Global Scale
Tue, Dec 23rd 2008, 13:17
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Authoritarianism often can achieve the same set of responses in any qualitative research and yet would be called an authoritarian structure and/or a state. Singapore as one example of a prosperous state that is considered authoritarian would be quite different from, say, Afghanistan under the Taliban Regime that was also authoritarian. Democracy as in Swden or Denmark would be an example of a democratic state but would be quite different from say, Pakistan or even India (though considered an established democracy here). The difference lies in the institutions and the institutionalization of certain norms and values that go towards defining the 'structural mores', if you may. The issue at hand is: how would the world community achieve a certain degree of democratization that would pass the EU-FRA standards? How would one achieve the internalization of certain values that make democracy seem so natural to so many parts of the world? Without, of course, inviting criticisms of attempting strategic real-politik or encouraging a Huntington-ian clash of civilizations, while wondering about the implicit re-making of the world order. That is the crux of the issue and problem here.