EU Needs to Rethink CSDP Missions
Muriel Asseburg et al.| Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik | February 2010
The over 20 operations and missions conducted up to present within the framework of the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) have had mixed results, both for civilian and military operations. While some missions like the one in Indonesia have been extraordinarily successful, others like the EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission have failed miserably. If the EU intends to be taken seriously as a strategic actor on the international stage, it will have to rethink the fundamentals of its mission design and implementation.
One of the main problems with the EU’s present approach is that the European Union does not react to security threats, unless it is asked to do so by an external request or a current crisis forces it to act. This renders the timely dispatch of troops difficult. Only five missions were in place within a month’s time. Additionally, most missions come about only at the particular urging of one member state, without being sufficiently supported by other members. The discord among member states can lead to mandates being construed so narrowly as to doom a mission to failure from the outset, as was the case with the EUFOR Congo mission. There is also a lack of communication between member states, EU special emissaries, EU delegates and team leaders on location. Moreover, there is an absence of any type of critical mission assessment. Hence there is no process of learning lessons and set-backs are not properly understood nor alternative action scenarios developed. This renders a quick adaptation to changing circumstances particularly challenging, as was the case with the surprise election victory of Hamas in 2007 which brought the EU BAM Rafah to naught.
In order to become a strategic actor on the international stage, the EU must act pre-emptively and not simply react to situations as they arise. The EU should only take on missions that are supported by a sufficient number of member states, otherwise there is the danger that member states will not fulfil their pledges. This can lead to missions being understaffed and under-supplied as was the case with EUPOL Afghanistan. Communication between the various actors on the ground must be improved in order to take advantage of the expertise of manpower on location. Moreover, functional and geographic divisions within the Council Secretariat ought to work together more closely in the analysis of past deployments. Each mission should be supplied with its own budget (a so-called quick impact budget) that allows commanders to provide local authorities with certain amenities, such as various technical means of communication, in order to provide incentives for their cooperation. It is essential to the success of the CSDP mission that the states in question perceive the EU as an independent and trustworthy third entity. The lack of coordination among actors not only damages the European Union’s image and detrimentally reflects on the efficacy of the mission, but it can also harm the EU’s ability to act in future crisis scenarios. More…
“This summary was prepared by the Atlantic Community Editorial Team from "Die EU als strategischer Akteur in der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik?" published here by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.
