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Accept A Divided Iraq

Gareth Stansfield

Stansfield advises that Iraq can no longer be expected to survive as an undivided entity. This is just one of a number of realities which coalition forces in the country must accept before they can devise practical and realistic policy management plans.

New policy should address what’s happening now:

• The Iraqi social fabric is hanging by a thread. Identity has emerged as the primary political framework, similar to other examples of community-based violence such as Rwanda and Bosnia
• Several civil wars and insurgencies are raging at once, and each has different reasons, strategies and goals (see below)
• Regional powers have a greater ability to influence Iraq than the United States or Great Britain
• Al Qaeda’s momentum in Iraq is growing despite its position being challenged by local actors

The tension in Iraq has become internalized, with various factions vying for political power. Conflict dynamics range from struggles for state power to inter-ethnic clashes, even Shia-Shia (Sadrist–Badr) and Sunni-Sunni (Islamic–Baathist) discord, and crime is rampant. The coalition should also accept that Iraq’s neighbors, despite their different aims, may all share an interest in continued instability:

• Saudi Arabia has worries of a major shift in the regional Sunni-Shia power balance
• Iran could significantly influence the outcome of a major civil war in its own favor
• Turkey could have the opportunity to halt the increasing strength of northern Iraq’s Kurds

The Right Steps Forward

1. Internal strategy for Iraq must bring the return of a meaningful Sunni presence to the political process—this will probably call for constitutional bargains, especially regarding the distribution of oil revenue. Rifts between foreign and homegrown Jihadists and also between Islamists and Ba’thists, however, could leave room for political maneuvering.
2. The Kurdish political demands for federalism and a high degree of autonomy must be accepted and even promoted, as the Kurds may otherwise refuse to remain peacefully within the state’s borders.
3. How the oil law is drafted will closely influence Iraq’s future as a federally administered entity; the law must be resolved by 2008 and currently presents a major point of contention between Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite factions.
4. Muqtada al Sadr must also be accommodated. He commands substantial support and thus political legitimacy. Isolation will simply push him further under the influence of Iran, which is in neither the US nor Iraq’s own interest.

There are two final thoughts which the coalition must keep in mind: first, the stabilization and eventual political normalization of Iraq—if still possible—will take years, perhaps a decade or more. Second, solutions to the current problems must come from within Iraq. No amount of regional or coalition involvement can compensate for a divided people.


The summary above was prepared by the Atlantic Community editorial team from a Chatham House Report by Gareth Stansfield, published in May 2007.


Chatham House, Accepting Realities in Iraq

Prepared by Niklas Keller

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