Issues Navigator

Global Challenges

Strategic Regions

Domestic Debates

Tag cloud

See All Tags

August 20, 2009 |  10 comments |  Print | E-Mail Your Opinion  

L. Korb and M. Wilkins

Topic A Slow Countdown Towards Zero

L. Korb and M. Wilkins: Even though a nuclear-free world may never be achieved, the aspiration is an end in itself. The steps towards Global Zero will help discourage nuclear proliferation. Ultimately, the feasibility of nuclear abolition will depend on the logic of nuclear deterrence being perceived as obsolete.

Is worldwide nuclear disarmament a feasible goal worth pursuing? While achieving this objective may prove impossible in the short term, pursuing the goal of a nuclear-free world will help the world's existing nuclear powers discourage proliferation, and help stabilize the international system.

The feasibility of global zero hinges on the question of whether the logic of nuclear deterrence will ever seem completely obsolete in the eyes of today's nuclear powers - in other words, whether they can be convinced that nuclear weapons are not preventing dangers more serious and more likely than those they are creating.  On this front, there have been several promising developments and trends. One may just recall the famous Wall Street article by Schultz, Perry, Kissinger and Nunn, or President Obama's campaign, where he openly recommitted the U.S. to eventually abandon its nuclear stockpile, a notion that has the support of all of America's allies and security partners, who, under the requirements of the NPT, are obliged to follow suit. Earlier this year, Obama and Russian President Medvedev committed "our two nations to achieving a nuclear-free world." Moreover, in spite of several years of deteriorating relations with Russia and ongoing debate over the extent of America's commitment to Taiwan, there is no danger that the world's three great nuclear weapons powers (Russia, China, and the U.S.) would take actions that could lead to nuclear war.  Finally, the likelihood of nuclear deterrence proving effective against transnational terrorist groups who do not represent any government is highly doubtful, negating these weapons' usefulness in current U.S. conflicts.

However, we are unlikely to see outright disarmament for some time to come.The joint understanding signed by the U.S. and Russia in July allows each side to maintain between 1,500 and 1,675 warheads and 500 to 1,100 strategic delivery vehicles.  Negotiations with the DPRK and Iran are strained, and there does not appear to be progress towards any kind of nuclear disarmament agreement between India and Pakistan.

In addition, there are at least four rationales for keeping some nuclear weapons. First, if possessing these weapons would not in itself make war more likely, then one could argue that there is no reason for a state not to retain them anyway as a contingency to deter war and aggression.  Second, if the U.S. or Russia were to reduce its stockpile too dramatically, it could encourage proliferation among states attempting to gain strategic superiority over them. Third, too-dramatic reductions on the part of the U.S. could actually incentivize proliferation among its allies, because such reductions could lead states currently under the U.S. nuclear umbrella (i.e. Japan) to doubt America's commitment to protecting them, driving them to pursue their own nuclear deterrents to balance against their perceived threats (i.e. the DPRK).  Finally, even if a state dismantles its nuclear weapons, the human knowledge and technical capability to build weapons cannot be undone.

Nevertheless, a number of policy options remain open to the U.S. that would encourage movement towards global zero, particularly ratifying and enforcing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty, halting the production of small nuclear weapons (i.e. the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator) and the Reliable Replacement Warhead, and strengthening the IAEA. While these steps may not lead to complete disarmament in the short term, these measures would discourage nuclear proliferation, which is certainly a critical short-run goal. In addition, the U.S. should continue to push for additional arms reductions with Russia. Some will likely speculate that bilateral arms reductions will say more about America's relationship with Russia than they do about either's philosophical commitment to the goal of nuclear disarmament.  However, the fact remains such agreements will still send a message to other countries that the world's strongest nuclear powers are losing faith in the usefulness of these weapons, and this may in turn encourage them to embrace this perspective as well.

Lawrence J. Korb, a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and Senior Adviser to the Center for Defense Informati on. He served as Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan Administration. Milton Wilkins is a Research Intern at the Center for American Progress.

Related Materials from Atlantic-Community:

  • 5
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this Article! What's this?

 
 
Comments
Greg Randolph Lawson

August 20, 2009

  • 3
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
"In addition, there are at least four rationales for keeping some nuclear weapons. First, if possessing these weapons would not in itself make war more likely, then one could argue that there is no reason for a state not to retain them anyway as a contingency to deter war and aggression. Second, if the U.S. or Russia were to reduce its stockpile too dramatically, it could encourage proliferation among states attempting to gain strategic superiority over them. Third, too-dramatic reductions on the part of the U.S. could actually incentivize proliferation among its allies, because such reductions could lead states currently under the U.S. nuclear umbrella (i.e. Japan) to doubt America's commitment to protecting them, driving them to pursue their own nuclear deterrents to balance against their perceived threats (i.e. the DPRK). Finally, even if a state dismantles its nuclear weapons, the human knowledge and technical capability to build weapons cannot be undone."

The above four rationales seem compelling reasons against disarmament. I would add a fifth that I mentioned before:

Nuclear weapons may not reduce the risk of "small scale war", counterinsurgency, and civil conflicts, but it has kept a lid on overt "Great Power" conflict since their inception.

When you add that to the four mentioned by Mr. Korb and Mr. Wilkins, I believe once more, the wisdom of the entire "Global Zero" movement is called into question.

I reiterate, this does not mean, I think its a great thing to have nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, it's like Pandora's Box, once opened, it can't be closed.
 
Julia  Lissek

August 21, 2009

  • 3
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Mr. Korb, Mr. Wilkins, thank you very much for this insightful article. All articles I read so far in this very interesting (and in my eyes highly important and overdue) theme week have been exceptionally good, but yours is outstanding!

@ Greg: I think your point is somewhat understandable, nevertheless I think you should try to emancipate yourself a bit from black and white thinking. In my opinion, the rational behind the Korb/Wilkins article is, that even if nuclear zero is not feasible (and maybe not admirable) as long as we cannot escape the prisoners dilemma related logic of deterrence, aiming towards global zero is an end in itself. Even if it might be utopian that mankind will ever reach zero, the sheer aim of nuclear abolition may be a big help to stop further nuclear built up, or even to reach disarmament to certain degree. I think this is of overarching importance, as I totally disagree on your point you mention in your comment on the Luongo article( http://www.atlantic-community.org/index/articles/view/Controlling_L... ) (@AC, is there any possibility to put Hyperlinks in your comments):

"... I believe reducing US arsenals is not necessarily wise"

because it is somewhat contradicts your second point:

"... it is extremely prudent to limit access to nuclear material that is not currently adequately secured ..."

In order to limit the access for rouge elements/terrorists to nuclear material, disarmament is crucial. Quantity plays a big role as it is, obviously, easier to secure 20 nukes than 2.500.

Above all, disarmament does not contradict deterrence theory per se. Due to the massive power of nukes deterrence works with 80 warheads as good as with 800 or 8000. Even 20 warheads are enough, to blow the world up - anything else is a question of status (super power or not?), though in my eyes nuclear built up/disarmament is best to be explained with a constructivist's perception approach, and not only with realists argument of deterrence...

 
Urs  Schrade

August 21, 2009

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Dear Greg, Julia,

thank you for your comments. Indeed, your conversation points out the crucial area of conflict in disarmament debate: the need to deterre vs. the need to disarm in order to prevent terrorists getting access to nukes.

I tend to agree on Julia's apporach, as I also belive the goal of global zero is - evem it might be not feasible - an end in itself, to stop further nuclear built up. The stop of nuclear built up or, even better, disarmament is not only important to prevent terrorists getting acces to nukes. It may also send out a sign to states like DRNK or Iran, that the Nuclear States will finaly behave in the way it is foreseen in the NPT, and thus giving them an incident to rethink their nuclear programs.

@all members: I would very much appreciate to hear your opinon on this crucial issue? This is a matter of global concerne, that may decide in some way on mankinds future.

 
Nikolina-Romana  Milunovic

August 21, 2009

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
I must agree with Mr. Schrade and the authors: the aspiration of global zero is an end to itself, however I believe that Donald Stadler made the most crucial point in a previous debate:

"Were the US and Russia to completely nuclearly disarm, followed by the UK, France, China, South Africa, Pakistan, and India, the world would change. North Korea would be the sole nuclear power absent some kind of miracle."

Before the issue of North Korea's nuclear ambitions, or all potentially dangerous hotspots with nuclear ambitions is resolved I do not see Global Zero being feasible nor desirable. Yes, of course I hope for a world free of nuclear weaponry, but no, I do not want Pyongyang or Tehran to have the ultimate "game-changer" at their disposal.
 
Joshua  Posaner

August 21, 2009

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Mr Schrade & Ms. Milunovic,

Although I agree, and have written elsewhere, that Global Zero is a noble goal worth pursuing, I now disagree with the idea that if the US and Russia disarm it will encourage Iran and North Korea to do the same. Both Tehran and Pyongyang realize the perception of power that nuclear arms gives them, and lets face it, neither of them have ever been very enthusiastic about walking the path set out for them by global leaders.

Ms. Milunovic, if Global Zero is neither feasible or desirable then is it impossible and unwanted? In that case, what path do you see? Should we maintain the status quo? For me it is highly desirable but completely unfeasible, there is only a benefit to gain in the continued struggle against nuclear proliferation.
 
Nikolina-Romana  Milunovic

August 21, 2009

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Mr. Posaner,
to answer your question about Global Zero being unwanted I direct you to my comment from above: "I hope for a world free of nuclear weaponry, but no, I do not want Pyongyang or Tehran to have the ultimate "game-changer" at their disposal."
Of course, the status quo should be improved and yes, Global Zero would be a great end, but only if North Korea and Pyongyang were to drag along.
 
Ilyas M. Mohsin

August 21, 2009

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Global Zero is an idealistic objective. Accordingly the above observations by colleagues make an enlightening reading.
To my mind, Obama acting as an idealist of 'yes, we can' vintage has
floated this great human longing, perhaps in theory only, as an epitome of his disposition politically. Medvedev, perhaps not to look a second-fiddle, joined the chorus. While it is a very noble pursuit, it appears to be a really 'far pavilion' considering our objective realities.
Despite Globalization, Communication Blitz etc, the world remains divided in to blocks, informally, whish cling to awful biases etc. While some spell the same out, others remain aloof but committed to the same. Moreover, prima facie, the developed world, and to an extent, even the others dubbed as 'developing' appear to be attracted to treating money as the somum bonum of life. This undermines the basic norms set by various cultures for maintaing a viable world. Religion, which also created bigotry in a fringe of society, taught good moral values. Even Communism in theory does not advocate what was done by Stalin, Breznhev, Mao or Tito etc.
See white countries in general. Look at the black-white complexes in the US. The loonies in the right-wing disgrace their electoral process by making ridiculous asssertions about their elected-President, just because he is a black born of white woman/black father and a democrat with more humanistic approach. Likewise there would be loopholes in the socities of the coloured people etc.
In such an environment, fairness can rarely prevail except in expedient
instalments because it is difficult to part with your acquisitions. Look at the awful colonies. Millions had to die before the Powers holding these areas realized that the cost-benefit ratio had become sour for maintaing the status quo. US was lucky as very few of her citizens died in getting rid of English colonials upto 1776.
Nuclear weapons would be a low priority only if and when we start believing in the sanctity of human life regardless of colour, creed, race etc. George W' induced war on Iraq on the fake-pretext of WMD, duly abetted by Berlusconi and Blair, has killed more a million Iraqis and the menace continues. Now the whole world knows what happened but who cares! The media is now full of accounts how Blackwater was in league with Dick Cheney for all kinds of unlawful killings. The big money made by the Military-Industrial complex, as defined by President Eisenhower in 1960, and the bizarre pilferage of oil by the US during the occupation of Iraq, specially when oil prices were high have made history. Afghanistan without the oil is the carry-over.While many nice Americans hate such malpractices, there is little that they can do because of naivety, ignorance etc. They get fooled easily as Tom Ridge, the-then head of Homeland security, has disclosed in his new book as to how he had to raise false alarms about security at the instanc e of the White House just before 2004 Presidential Elections.
I believe we should first cultivate proper respect for 'life, liberty, and justice' at human level regardless of historical/geograpical considerations, only then such issues will get resolved in due course with relative ease.
 
Donald  Stadler

August 21, 2009

  • 3
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Having ealier made the point that complete disarmament is not practical in the current political climate, I would like to point out several other not so hard facts:

In terms of reasonable reductions in the nuclear arsenals of major world powers, North Korea's current arsenal need make no difference at all. The US and Russia could cut their arsenals 25% and it would make no difference to the North Korean situation. It may be that the US and Russia could cut to 1000 warheads - I doubt even then North Korea would be a significant factor in the calculations. I'm not in a position to make a judgement about wht the level should be, I leave that kind of thing to the experts.

The Obama-Mendenev plan to cut back US and Russian stockpiles is desireable for other reasons. Should those weapons be retired and verifiably destroyed and the fillile material made unusable, it would simplify the job of managing (and most urgently, securing) the remaining arsenals. Bit the most important gain would be a symbolic on. 30 years ago I might have derided symploism, but not now. We have seen it's power at work, and it is worth doing again to reduce US-Russian tensions.

My final point is that while I remain a hawk compared to most of the participants in this discussion, I've been around long enough to learn to never say never. The situation may change. Disarming is easy up to a point, but becomes much more difficult after that. The political problem of persuading so many countries to disarm their nuclear warheads completely will be extremely difficult. And yet gains can be made, I think.

For an example, it is estimated that India and Pakistan both have about 60 warheads now. What if a treaty could be negociated to verifiably cut that in half, on both sides? That is certainly more doable than going for zero, and it might reduce tensions, as it has for the US and Russia. If so, would it be worth doing? Of course. If Kashmir could be neutraized as an issue, something ike this is possible. After that it might be possibe to do it again, down to 15.

So I encourage the ideaists here to continue to think big thoughts, whies recognizing that those more skeptical are not the enemy.
 
Unregistered User

August 22, 2009

  • 3
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Urs Schrade and the other members of the Altantic-Community team deserve a lot of credit for stimulating such a lively debate. Since I already have my own article on this Website, I will be relatively brief in my comments on the Korb/Wilkins article, which is very thought provoking. These comments are also relevant to the issues raised by the Shirer/Wilson article on whether it is necessary to resolve regional conflicts before nuclear disarmament can be achieved.

My main comment is that political relationships fundamentally matter. That is, if two nuclear-armed enemies or even rivals cannot at a minimum begin to lay out a pathway for resolving their security conflicts, then they will not likely be able to decide to disarm their nuclear arsenals. This does not mean that they must resolve every conflict, but it does mean that they must be serious about committing to this resolution and are taking other non-nuclear steps (economic and social problem solving as well as conventional arms control) to reduce tensions between them. For example, the United States and Russia still have major sources of tension, including Russian suscipions about NATO enlargement and US missile defense plans, that are holding them back from making truly significant steps toward nuclear disarmament. Those major sources of tension must be resolved before Russia feels more secure in order to then consider substantial, i.e., truly deep cuts in its nuclear arsenal. Of course, the two countries will not have to clear up all disagreements but only those that seem to compel Moscow to hold onto nuclear weapons to off set its conventional military inferiority.

Second and related comment is that security resolution and often political transformation must come first before a nuclear-armed state will dismantle its arsenal. For example, South Africa had to break free of the political stranglehold of apartheid and had to feel more secure before it could dismantle its nuclear arsenal. North Korea is in a similar seige mentality. Another example is that the Soviet Union needed a political (and economic) crisis and a visionary leader like Gorbachev before it was able to take substantial cuts in its nuclear arsenal. Let's applaud Gorbachev and Reagan for embracing that vision of a nuclear weapon free world.

Final comment is that if we are serious about reducing and eventually eliminating the risk of nuclear terrorism through nuclear disarmament we need to expand our definition of this disarmament to include fissile materials like highly enriched uranium (HEU) in the civilian sector. There are still dozens of nuclear research reactors using HEU, for example. We need a global phase out of HEU in both the weapons and civilian sectors.

Regards,

Charles Ferguson
 
Colette Grace Mazzucelli

August 23, 2009

  • 2
  •  
  •  
  • No rating possible
  • No rating possible
I like this comment! What's this?
Hello Mr. Lawson,

Thank you for your comments. Your initial argument in favor of arms at reduced levels to support deterrence is one that strikes me as more plausible among the great, and rising, powers.

Among those aspirants to the nuclear club, including states with extensive non-state networks, nuclear weapons, even at reduced levels, are a motivating factor to join an elite group. There is an immediate and some would argue, urgent, trade-off in terms of the benefits deterrence provides versus the costs of an ever-expanding club of nuclear powers, including possibly a terrorist group.

Your second point is to me a matter of timing. If the reductions in US and Russian arsenals were to occur in phases over a longer period, this could discourage nuclear proliferation although the objective of superiority could well play out on the conventional side, which would increase the strategic importance of military alliances with those states that have sizeable armies, i.e., Turkey in the Middle East; China in Asia. Those militaries increasingly serve to deny/secure access to strategic resources.

The third point underlines complex dynamics in third states used to US protection, in my view. Take your point about Japan. Are dramatic reductions on the US side likely to provoke the pursuit by the Japanese of a nuclear deterrent or the nationalist forces inside that society, which have an incentive on the domestic political scene to instrumentalize the choice regardless of US actions?

It is your last point that resonates most strongly in my understanding of the challenges of nuclear disarmament. I do not think that the world's leaders can close Pandora's Box in terms of the complete elimination of these weapons.

I do believe that, if enough of the world's powers can agree to limit the production of the materials necessary to create these weapons, this can limit effectively the number of state and non-state actors that can acquire nuclear weapons in this century. This would leave the reponsibility to reduce as far as possible current arsenals to a small group of powers, which must simultaneously implement measures to strengthen considerably the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.

All the best and greetings from Old Town, Colette Mazzucelli
Tags: | nuclear disarmament |
 

Create Comment

Type the characters shown in the image below into the textfield.
Captcha

What are tags?

Community

Jobs / Internships

Call for Papers

Atlantic Events

Partners

User of the day

Sudakshina  Chattopadhyay
Sudakshina Chattopadhyay
Member since
March 14, 2011

Poll

Should NATO intervene in Syria?